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Abstract 
Previous literature on IT and productivity does not take into account different 
organizational goals and different management strategies for achieving these goals. But 
productivity and ROI relationships can easily differ as organizational goals and 
management strategies differ. Therefore, we argue, it is no longer appropriate to ask, 
"Does IT lead to productivity enhancement." or "Is the ROI on IT investments large or 
small or nonexistent?'The better question is under what conditions of organizational 
climate and management choice does IT enhanced productivity result. 
To illustrate the powefil effect of organizational goals and management strategy 
on IT-productivity relationships, we examine the twenty year history of two of the largest 
IT users in the world: the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security 
Administration. And we find that these two very similar agencies experienced very 
different results from massive investments in IT despite sharing a similar production 
function. There is nothing in micro economics however to explain the different strategies 
pursed by these managers. Instead we must turn to political and sociological models of 
organizations to understand the social construction of productivity results. 
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Management Strategy, Investment in IT, and Productivity 
In the debate about investment in IT and productivity, managers and organizational 
strategy are usually not mentioned. Virtually none of the literature describing the so- 
called "productivity paradox" --the finding that IT does not lead to increases in 
productivity--examines the role of management in producing productivity. But clearly 
managers do have a powe&l role in shaping the consequences of IT investment and the 
strategies which organizations pursue when making IT investments are also critical for 
understanding the impacts of IT . 
In this paper we examine the production expansion strategies pursued by managers 
over a twenty year period (1 970- 1990) at two of the largest users of computing equipment 
in the US: the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS). Using Cobb-Douglas production models to allow for diminishing returns and 
parsimony, we estimated the input elasticities, the stability of elasticities over time, and 
compared the estimates across agencies (to see if they faced similar production functions). 
The results are surprising and puzzling. The managers at one agency expanded 
output by investing in labor exclusively for the first ten years (1 970- 1980), and then 
radically altered course and increased IT investment by a factor of 60 while it cut labor by 
25%. The second agency followed a much more conservative expansion strategy of 
adding both labor and capital IT in roughly equal amounts over a twenty year period. The 
first agency received high productivity returns on IT investment, while the second agency 
received almost none. Its workers were no more productive in 1990 than they were in 
1970. 
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The results are surprising because of the variation in management strategies. The 
results are puzzling because analysis shows both agencies faced the same production 
hnction and factor costs!. They should have followed the same rational expansion path. 
The paper examines the political and cultural environment which shaped the decisions 
because the economic model cannot explain these results. 
IT Related Productivity Changes: Theory and Measure 
Digital information technology--perhaps more than any other single technology in 
industrial history-- promised to have enormous impacts on economic efficiency and 
productivity because of its direct impact on an important factor of production, namely, 
information and knowledge. In advanced information economies, where information and 
knowledge workers account for 60% of GDP ( Wolff and Baumol, 1987 ), it makes sense 
to believe that the vast improvements in computer hardware and software over the last 20 
years, and the vast increases in IT investment both in factories and offices, would surely 
lead to widespread and powerhl gains in productivity as a direct result of IT investments. 
But while US spending on IT surged in the period 1970-1 990, little formal evidence exists 
linking IT investment to productivity. 
Empirical reseaich conducted over the last twenty years at the economy-wide , 
sector, and organizational level supports the finding that investments in IT have brought 
mixed results. In some instances, IT apparently led to order of magnitude increases in 
productivity (Barua, et. a]., 1991 ; Siege1 and Griliches, 1991; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 
1993), while in others IT has not recovered its costs or shows positive returns only in 
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certain applications (Loveman, 1988, 199 1 ; Weill, 19992; Berndt and Morrison, 1 992; 
Cron and Sobol, 1983; Strassman, 1990; Roche, 1988; 1991; 1992; Parsons, et. al., 1990). 
Aggregate level data for the entire economy is now showing positive returns to IT 
investment, and in one of the best studies to date, based on 367 large firms, Brynolfsson 
and Hitt report truly fantastic gross returns on investment (ROI) for IT averaging 58% in 
manufacturing and 81% in services (Brynolfsson and Hitt, 1993). 
Despite more positive recent data, there remains substantial evidence that much 
investment in IT does not lead to productivity enhancements. Many explanations have 
been given for why this may happen. Four reasons are usually given: mismeasurement of 
outputs and inputs; lagged effects due to learning; dissipation of benefits outside the firm; 
mismanagement--irrational or ignorant or self-interested behavior, and the presence or 
absence of external cultures which shape management decisions (Brynjolfsson, 1993; 
Panko, 1991 ; Roche, 1991; Laudon, 1986; Laudon and Marr, 1994). 
Few authors have questioned the theory behind the debate. The productivity 
paradox arises not just because IT professional and public expectations are bruised by the 
negative findings, but also because the findings do not match the theory. The temptation 
is to question the findings rather than the theory. 
Much of the research on IT and productivity is conducted within the theoretical 
framework of micro economics. Here, firms are portrayed as rational profit maximizing 
entities with perfect information and unlimited analytic abilities. Managers, it is assumed, 
pursue short term profit maximization and also have complete information and unlimited 
reasoning powers. After nearly a hundred years of experience, it is now well understood 
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that this theory is neither descriptive or predictive of the behavior of specific, real-world 
firms or managers. Nevertheless, when practitioners of this theory confiont empirical 
evidence that managers invest in IT even though no measurable productivity benefits 
result, they can only assume the measures are wrong or the managers are irrational. 
Oddly, wildly positive findings are not questioned. For instance, the finding of 
Brynolfsson and Hitt (1993) that ROI on IT investment is 81% for manufacturing and 
services is completely unexpected in micro economic theory. This finding suggests that 
managers are truly irrational because they should, according to theory, invest in factors 
until the returns are roughly equal. 
Most investigations of IT-based productivity ignore the organizational processes 
which bring about productivity impacts (or the lack thereof) (the exception is Weill, 
1992). Yet the inescapable conclusion after reviewing the literature on IT and 
productivity is that the results in investment are variable, and perhaps dependent on 
historical period (with earlier investments having lower returns, but also lower returns 
being associated with periods of high technological change and competence destroying 
change) , management and staff learning, organizational stability, and organizational 
variables not yet identified. (Tushman, 1986). The lack of theoretical sophistication in 
this area hampers our understanding of precisely how IT may or may not impact 
productivity, 
What we suggest in this paper is that we need a new theory about the relationship 
between managers, strategy, and productivity. In this new theory, it would be entirely 
possible for managers to invest heavily in IT and not show productivity results in the near 
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term. The findings therefore that IT does not always lead to productivity enhancement 
should not be thought of as an anomaly, but should be expected in many cases. 
Managers, Strategy, and IT Induced Productivity 
Our contention in this paper is that managers make choices about the allocation of 
IT resources according to their perceptions of organizational strategy. Organizational 
strategies 
are planned actions in pursuit of strategic goals. For profit maximizing firms, there are 
two generic strategies at the business level: differentiation and/or low cost provider. For 
firms and managers which choose differentiation, the ROI and productivity benefits of 
investing in IT may be quite different from firms and managers which choose lowering 
costs as a strategy. Different organizational strategies will lead to different returns on IT 
investment. 
Differentiation as a business level strategy generally requires long term investments 
in product design, business process change, and organizational knowledge bases (core 
competencies). Becoming the low cost provider however may be achievable in a much 
shorter time fiame because in many instances expensive labor can be replaced by capital 
relatively quickly. 
The diversity and time-frame of organizational strategies has a direct bearing on 
the productivity benefits of IT, or any capital investment. A recent survey of 500 firms 
documented the diversity of expected payoffs from IT investment (See Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 The Diversity of Expected Payoffs from IT Investment 
Source: Erik Brynjolfsson, "Technology's True Payoff," Informationweek, October 10, 
1994. Permission required. 
............................ 
Clearly some of the benefits of IT investment envisaged by managers will take a relatively 
long time to achieve, but ultimately may contribute to the productivity of workers through 
their impact on either cost or differentiation. Customer service, timeliness, quality, 
flexibility, management information and infrastructure investments are elements of 
differentiation strategies. The time focus of these kinds of goals is typically 2-5 years. 
Cost reconstruction, and reengineering, are elements of ZOMJ-cost provider strategtes 
which typically have a shorter time focus. Organizational strategies have a bearing on 
what types of applications are developed. Weill has found, for instance, that the 
productivity benefits for investment in transaction processing applications is positive, 
while ROI for management information system investments and infrastructure is zero or 
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negative. Both ROI and productivity benefits for, say, quality or customer service may be 
quite long. 
One can easily imagine scenarios under which the benefits from investing in IT are 
zero and investing in more labor may have large impacts. For instance, buying PCs for 
every computer illiterate attorney in a law firm may have no impact on production, 
whereas hiring more attorneys will have predictable and large increases in output. For a 
law firm, one good young lawyer may be worth a thousand PCs, and investing in PCs may 
have a relatively small impact on the fortunes of the firm. 
It is often assumed that when managers face demands for higher levels of 
production, they should pursue a single strategy: employ more IT. But of course 
managers do have an alternative to capital investment in IT. They can--and do-- expand 
production by investing in labor. Sometimes this labor investment is in the form of more 
employees, and sometimes in the form of more training and education of the existing labor 
force. In fact, economics tells us that managers should invest in labor and IT depending 
on their contribution to total output (their elasticities), which in turn depends on the 
specific production function, and the factor costs, which the manager faces. Moreover, 
For each production fbnction, for each set of factor costs, there is an optimal expansion 
path leading to the highest output with least input of resources. Rational managers should 
pursue this path which may involve investment in both labor and IT capital. 
Below we explore the impact which different organizational strategies has on the 
productivity benefits of IT investments at two of the largest IT user sites in the US for the 
period 1970-1990: Social Security Administration (SSA) and Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS). Based on detailed IT investment, employment, and output data over twenty years, 
we found that only one agency had achieved significant productivity benefits while the 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-95-07 
other achieved no results whatever. These results cannot be explained by traditional 
microeconomic theories. We argue that IT-induced productivity benefits resulted in one 
case because of a conscious management strategy to achieve cost reduction, while in the 
other case IT benefits did not result because management was pursuing a different 
strategy--in this case maximization of total revenues. We extend this analysis to the larger 
economy and examine how this new theory helps us understand recent claims that IT is 
finally having positive productivity benefits at the sector level. 
4.0 Information Technology at SSA, IRS, and the FBI, 1970-1990 
The Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), are among the largest and in some areas the most sophisticated users of information 
technology in the civilian economy of the US SSA began developing automated large file 
handling techniques with IBM as early as 1940. The IRS began using digital computers 
much later, in the early 1960s 
SSA employs 65,000 workers to maintain earnings data on over 200 million 
American citizens who are current or former labor force participants, distributes 40 million 
checks each month, and administers a number of complex, earnings based social welfare 
programs the largest of which is the Old Age and Survivors Insurance program. SSA 
maintains a centralized organizational structure established in 1936, including a large 
centralized mainframe-based data center in Baltimore, Maryland, connected via satellite to 
10 regional centers and 1300 local SSA ofices throughout the country. Following the 
near collapse of its data processing systems in the late 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  SSA began a $2 billion 
program to rebuild its systems and re-design its organizational and work processes (SSA, 
1993). 
IRS employs 120,000 workers to maintain earnings data on 200 million working 
Americans and 4.4 million other reporting entities, and to administer the tax laws of the 
United States. IRS maintains a centralized organizational structure originally established 
in the 1920s including a large centralized mainframe data center in Martinsburg, Virginia, 
connected via a variety of telecommunications links to 10 regional service centers where 
paper tax returns are initially processed into computer tapes which are then transported 
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physically to Martinsburg. Despite massive increases in computer processing power, by 
most accounts the IRS administrative systems neared collapse in the late 1980s. IRS 
systems have changed little since the early 1960s except for hardware upgrades, and the 
system is at the limits of its performance capability. The IRS is currently engaged in a $6- 
8 billion modernization program. (National Research Council 1992; GAO 1995). 
Data 
The findings reported here are based upon a larger study of long term historical 
trends in information processing at the three agencies in the period 1940-1994. The study 
is based on 155 interviews with agency management, users, and vendors at federal, state 
and local levels in the period, General Accounting Office investigators, members of 
Congress, Congressional staff, 1985- 1994. In addition we gathered detailed quantitative 
data from a variety of private, federal agency, federal budget, and Congressional 
documents on the following variables: 
Enlployment: Detailed occupational data on each agency, 1940- 1990 
Workload: Detailed data on the number of forms processed (SSA and IRS), clients, 
services provided to clients, and (FBI) fingerprints stored and record requests processed, 
1940-1990. Other related work load data not reported here was also collected. 
Installed base: Detailed data on specific installed mainframe and mini computer machines, 
capacities (MIPS), and manufacturer. This data was gathered from GSA (General 
Services Administration Annual surveys, interviews, and agency reports). 
Budgets: Detailed budgetary data on investment in information technology capital 
(communications, data processing, and ofice equipment expenditures, 1940- 1990), non- 
information technology capital, labor, services, and real-estate. 
Wages: Detailed wage data on employees, 1940- 1990. 
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Only the analyses concerning organizational strategy and IT impacts on productivity are 
reported here. The analysis is limited to the period 1970-1990 because this period 
contains the most precise data, and it is the period of intensive investment in IT. 
Forthcoming papers describe occupational and employment impacts, patterns of budgetary 
growth, and patterns of technological advancement and diffusion. 
Measures 
Our interest in this paper is in identifying and understanding the relationship 
between productivity and the installed base of computing power over a twenty year 
period. There is little doubt that we have reasonably precise measures of IT capital 
installed (both monetary values and physical (MIPS) and the size of the labor force. 
Measuring the dependent variable, productivity, is less precise in this data. The dependent 
variable varies by agency but focuses in all cases on the labor productivity with respect to 
the primary work loads of the agencies. In the case of SSA, the dependent variable is the 
total number of clients served by the agency in each year divided by the total number of 
employees at SSA. At the IRS the dependent variable, productivity, is measured by the 
number of tax forms processed per employee. In the case of the FBI, productivity is 
measured by the number of fingerprints of all kinds (computerized and non-computerized) 
stored by the FBI per employee. 
As with all productivity measures, ours suffer a variety of problems. Not all the 
work at any of these agencies is entirely captured by these measures. IRS has a large 
number of people devoted exclusively to processing tax forms and also a significant 
number of employees devoted to tax compliance and enforcement. At SSA there are 
actually only a few employees devoted to maintaining the records while most employees 
are devoted to providing service to SSA clients. For the IRS and SSA, the nature and 
quality of the work that is being performed also changed over time. This is a problem that 
occurs for measuring productivity changes for any service based organization. We know 
of no data source that measures changes in the output quality of any of these three 
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agencies. One source of quality changes is the changing complexity of the work load. 
Although we developed several measures of complexity of work for this time period, 
none contributed usekl information to the problem of productivity at these agencies or 
altered the results reported here.' 
The best measure we have of productivity changes is thus the simple one of the 
measure of total output divided by total labor, which is the measure used by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics in estimating changes in government productivity [U.S. Dept. of Labor, 
BLS 19881. While our measures of productivity our admittedly gross, we feel they roughly 
shadow real changes in productivity at these agencies no matter how that is measured. Our 
data extend over a twenty year time frame and they roughly track the changes in 
productivity experienced in non-governmental information work sectors like FIRE 
(Finance, Insurance, Real-estate). For these reasons we believe our measures reflect real 
changes in productivity at these agencies. 
Model Specification 
For both the IRS and SSA data sets the objective was to relate the output (Forms for the 
IRS and Clients for the SSA) to information available on capital and labor inputs. For both 
agencies the inputs were employees and installed MIPS. Both sets of data were time series 
representing annual totals for twenty one years (1970 to 1990, inclusive). To allow for 
diminishing returns and parameter parsimony Cobb-Douglas production models were used. 
All inputs and outputs were measured in units. Thus both models were of the general form: 
Where: 
output of the agency (forms or clients processed) 
Bo= CONSTANT 
X= factor of production, e.g., MIPS, employees, lagged MIPS, or structural variable 
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61= parameter estimate 
The objectives of the modeling process were to estimate the input elasticities, evaluate 
elasticity stability over time and investigate input elasticity estimates across equations. The 
latter was undertaken to determine if the two agencies faced similar production functions. 
Both models were screened for cointegration properties (e.g. Charernza and Deadman 1992), 
no useful properties were found. 
In order to meet the modeling objectives standard hypothesis testing was undertaken. 
All models were validated using a 5% level of significance. In addition to the standard 
hypothesis tests used in model development the following additional hypothesis tests were 
run: 
Parameter Stabil i~: Tests were made to determine if there were significant changes in input 
elasticity estimates over time. 
Cross-Eqzmtioil Paranzeter Conparisoizs: A test was run to determine if the inputs' 
elasticities were significantly different across the two fitted equations. 
Results 
(a) the agencies experienced very different productivity results despite massive investments in 
IT over a 20 year period (Figure 2). IRS productivity (forms/employee) remained relatively 
stable as both MIPS and employees were added to achieve higher levels of output. At IRS, 
MIPS increased by a factor of 30, as employment doubled. At SSA, productivity declined 
until the mid 1980s, but then took a sudden surge upwards. During the period at SSA, MIPS 
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increased by a factor of 73 and employment doubled up to the mid 1980s and then took a 
sudden downward spiral. 
(b) the agencies followed very different IT capital and labor strategies to achieve expansion 
of output (Figure 3A and 3B). The IRS has undertaken a much more direct stroll up the 
productivity surface though the agency seems to show some tendency to invest in labor and 
capital in jumps. The IRS (3A) followed a more balanced strategy of adding both MIPS and 
labor, with different emphasis at different times. In the early years, the emphasis was on 
MIPS, but in the later years, employees were added faster than MIPS. 
The plot in Figure 3B clearly shows that SSA has followed some extreme directions in 
its expansion path over the twenty year period, investing mainly in employees for the first 
decade, then attempting to substitute MIPS for employees for the next decade. 
(c) an analysis of the production functions for these agencies does not explain these different 
outcomes from IT investments. The results of the individual model fitting are given in Tables 
I and 11. 
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TABLE 1 
Production Model: Internal Revenue Service (1 970- 1990) 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: LFORMS - LOG(FORMS) 
LEMP - LOG(EMPL0YEES) 
LMIPS - LOG(h4IPS) 
D - 1 if Year > 1981.0 ow. 
Source DF Squares Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 3 0.88564 0.29521 970.879 0.0001 
Error 17 0.00517 0.00030 
C Total 20 0.89081 
Root MSE 0.0 1744 R-square 
Dep Mean 18.82672 Adj R-sq 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameted p-value 
INTERCEP 1 15.607539 0.41918057 34.724 0.0001 
LEMP 1 0.250697 0.01141105 6.019 0.000 1 
LMIPS 1 0.083092 0.00676870 12.276 0.0001 
D 1 0.128538 0.01165015 8.774 0.000 1 
__----____-------_------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
TABLE I1 
Production Model: Social Security Agency (1970-1990) 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: LCLIENTS - LOG(CL1ENTS) 
LEMP - LOG(EMPL0YEES) 
LMIPS - LOG(M1PS) 
D - 1 if Year > 1978,O ow. SAS Autoreg Procedure 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
SSE 0.001155 DFE 14 
MSE 0.000082 Root MSE 0.009081 
SBC -1 17.054 AIC -123.029 
Reg Rsq 0.9978 Total Rsq 0.9946 
Durbin-Watson 1.3263 
Variable DF B Value Std Error t Ratio Appros Prob 
Intercept 1 13.9001872 0.14128 98.391 " 0.0001 
LEMP 1 0.2877141 0.01245 23.106 0.0001 
LMIPS 1 0.0106645 0.005 15 2.071 0.0574 
LAGMIPS 1 0.0451443 0.00545 8.276 0.0001 
D 1 0.0459085 0.00171 9.680 0.0001 
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As can be seen in the tables, both models were highly significant with high explanatory 
power. In both agencies installed MIPS is powefilly related to outputs. The IRS model 
required the inclusion of a structural dummy variable starting in 1981 to handle the mandated 
increase in tax forms.' Similarly, the SSA model required the inclusion of a structural 
dummy. 
Perhaps the most significant differences between the two models is the inclusion of a 
lagged MIPS variable in the SSA model. The inclusion of lagged MIPS in the SSA model 
possibly indicates that SSA has tendency to be slower in full utilization of newly installed 
MIPS than is the IRS. Certainly the ramp up of SSA IT spending and MIPS capacity 
increase is much steeper than that of IRS. The SSA model also differed with respect to the 
presence of serially correlated residuals, thus this model was fit using an autoregressive errors 
model estimated by maximum likelihood. 
The parameter estimates for the effect of employees was 0.25 in the IRS model and 
0.29 in the SSA model. Thus a one percent increase in employees would be expected to 
translate to a 0.25% increase in output in the IRS agency and a 0.29% increase in output 
at the SSA. These values were very close across the equations. The interpretation of the 
parameter for MIPS is similarly straightforward for the IRS, indicating that a 1% increase 
in MIPS would be expected to produce a 0.083% increase in output. 
The interpretation for the elasticity of MIPS in the SSA is made more problematical 
by the presence of the lagged MIPS term. The lagged term indicates that productivity in 
the SSA in any one year is related (substantially) to the level of MIPS in the prior year as 
well as the level of MIPS in the current year. Thus a 1% increase in MIPS in a given year 
might be expected to increase output by .01% in that year and .045% in the following 
year. 
This model further required the averaging of MIPS between 1975 and 9176. Such averaging suggests 
that not all MIPS installed in 1976 were fklly utilized in that year. A lagged MIPS variable did not 
contribute to this model in general. 
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To enable comparisons of the Effect of MIPS across equations we introduce the 
concept of effective MIPS for the SSA agency. The productivity of effective MIPS can be 
estimated by substituting current MIPS into lagged MIPS using the relationship 
LAGMIPS = 0.34109 + 0.908177*LMPS derived from regressing lagged LMIPS on 
LMIPS. Using this substitution, the effective MIPS coefficient becomes: 
%LMIPS + O LAGMIPS = O LMIPS + R3 t$J +q, LMIPS ) 
13 L =4 0 +(O,+B?)LMIPS 
3 3 
Where and are the least squares estimates for the regression of LAGMTPS on 
LMIPS. The first term,* R adds to the constant in the model and ( R + f3 sc) is the 
8 3' R 3 1  
coefficient for effective MIPS with a value of 0.051661 in this example. This estimate 
suggests that a 1% increase in effective MIPS would be expected to result in a .052% 
increase in output in from the SSA 
To summarize, MIPS is strongly related to output in both agencies. Based on these 
results, what would managers have to do to raise output by 1 %? At IRS, a 10% increase in 
MIPS (approximately 2 1 MIPS) or a 4% increase in employment (approximately 4,800 
employees). At SSA, to achieve a 1% increase in output, managers had a choice of adding 
20% more MIPS (about 130 MIPS) or adding 3% more employees (about 1950 employees). 
Alternatively, managers could have chosen a mixture of labor and IT capital to enhance 
output. 
The reader should note that at the SSA the effect of adding MIPS is considerably less 
than at the IRS (.05 at SSA versus .08 at IRS) . SSA built up rapidly one of the largest 
computer installations in the civilian world (650 MIPS) by 1990 and clearly the agency was 
beginning to experience declining returns on IT investment under the given production 
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process. IRS, on the other hand, had installed only around 200 MIPS and could effectively 
expand output with additional MIPS. 
(d) the input elasticities have not changed radically over the twenty year period. This means 
a MIP in 1970 has about as much impact on output as a MIP in 1990. Likewise with 
employees. In other words, there has not been a transformation of the production hnction 
over twenty years which can be related to improvements in IT 
These data sets cover 20 years during which there have been significant changes in 
computer technology. It is therefore important to determine if the productivity surfaces have 
remained stable over time. The presence of the structural change dummies indicate that some 
change has occurred over the twenty years. Further test were carried out to determine if input 
elasticity changes had occurred over two time periods that divided the data. Using the joint 
hypotheses that the coefficients on the inputs had not changed between the two periods the p- 
values for IRS and SSA were 0.2190 and 0.1828 respectively. It would seem that there is no 
strong evidence to suggest that the input elasticities have changed radically over the twenty 
years covered in this study. 
(e) the different strategies and outcomes pursued by IRS and SSA cannot be explained by 
dissimilarities in their production functions or different factor costs. The production functions 
are essentially similar. Both agencies face the same costs of equipment and labor, and the 
same civil service rules. 
Both input parameter estimates appear to be similar across the two agencies which 
leads to a consideration of the possibility that the two agencies face the same shape 
productivity surface, at least up to an additive constant. This question is complicated by 
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the presence of lagged MIPS in the SSA model. Thus the question was modified using the 
effective MIPS concept for SSA. Both equations were estimated using Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression methods with cross equation hypothesis tests using SAS Proc 
SYSLIN ( Judge et al. 1984). The joint null hypothesis were constructed in the following 
way, (using the notation MODEL.PARAMETER): 
& : IRS.LEMP - SSA.LEMP =: 0, 
: 1RS.LMIPS - SSA.LMIPS - .908117*SSA,LAGMIPS = 0 
This joint null could not be rejected at a 5% level of significance ( p-value = 0.1377). 
This indicates that there is some evidence to suggest that the two agencies face similar 
productivity surfaces (up to an additive constant and some structural change). See Figure 4 
for a graphic illustration of the respective production hnctions. 
Some caution is appropriate in claiming similarity between and stability within the IRS 
and SSA productivity models. These are small data sets and thus actual differences may be 
undetectable using such limited data. However, it would seem that the relationship between 
the basic inputs and outputs studied have not radically changed within and across the two 
series. 
Discussion 
If one accepts that these two agencies face comparable productivity surfaces (at least 
in terms of their input elasticities), then one is left with several interesting questions. 
Why did these agencies pursue such radically different strategies of expansion? Why did 
one agency achieve high levels of productivity--apparently related to very investments in 
It--and why did another similar agency achieve so little productivity returns? 
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Assuming that these agencies face similar costs there should be a "best" expansion 
path. It is quite possible that neither agency chose the "best" expansion path, but it seems 
obvious that they did not both choose the "best" expansion path! Indeed to understand 
the management strategies for expanding, we must leave the micro economic model and 
use political and sociological models. 
A brief review of the political and social environment of the two agencies in this 
period sheds a good deal of light on how they used information technology differently and 
obtained different results. SSA entered the 1970s as an exemplar of leading edge 
mainframe technology use in the Federal government. But during the 1970s several new 
programs were added to their agenda (Supplemental Security Income, Black Lung, 
Medicaid) which brought millions of new clients and thousands of pages of new 
regulations to learn and implement for SSA employees. At the same time, SSA failed to 
upgrade their systems as the number of clients rapidly increased with an aging population. 
Several efforts at system modernization failed in the mid and late 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  and by 1980 
systems nearly failed on several occasions to issue checks on time. Employment had 
ballooned by 30% in the 70s to cope with rising demands and failing systems. Senior 
executive turnover began to accelerate in the late 1970s, and internal conflicts with a 
unionized labor force expanded. Both Executive agencies (OMB, Office of the President, 
D E W )  and Congressional Committees became severely critical of SSA ( OTA, 1986) 
As the leading accomplishment of the New Deal, SSA was an unpopular agency in 
the Reagan administration. The President appointed several temporary Commissioners to 
head the agency, who in turn developed a plan in 1980 to modernize the agency's systems 
throughout the decade of the 1980s. This billion dollar Systems Modernization Plan was 
accepted by the White House on one condition: SSA would have to terminate 25,000 
employees as evidence that the systems modernization would in fact lead to higher levels 
of productivity. This deal was ultimately agreed to by key Congressional Committees who 
oversaw SSAs budget. SSAs senior management agreed in principle, but had a difficult 
time implementing the cutbacks. After firing one acting Commissioner, a new permanent 
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Commissioner was appointed in 1986 (the first permanent Commissioner in the Reagan 
era) who agreed to implement the cutbacks. Several internal senior management shifts 
also occurred in 1986, including the creation of a new office of Deputy Commissioner of 
Systems--a CIO like position. (OTA, 1986). From a peak employment of 87,000 in 1979, 
SSA has shrunk its labor force by 23,000 positions. 
In the end, SSA had little choice but to greatly reduce its labor force, develop new 
business procedures, new supporting software in order to survive the 1980s, and 
demonstrate that it could become more productive. The goals of the agency were to 
greatly enhance and expand service to clients, and the strategies "chosen" by management 
in response to powerfbl external pressures was to radically expand MIPS while radically 
cutting the labor force. The productivity numbers ultimately produced by SSA managers 
can only be understood within this social and political environment. 
Very different conditions obtained at the IRS. As a money gathering agency in a 
period of stagflation (the 1970s) , and later in the 1980s high budget deficits, the IRS was 
a very popular agency in the Executive Branch and in Congress. There is nothing more 
important to the White House and the Congress (or to any government) than the 
collection of taxes. As a result, historically there has been little in-depth, critical oversight 
of the agency (Burnham, 1989). Through much of the 1970s the IRS experienced a 
relatively stable legal-regulatory tax environment, and its systems developed in the 1960s 
were sufficient. The Carter administration turned down a major effort to re-build R S  
systems ( OTA, 1977). However, changes in tax law in 1984, 1986 and 1987 began to 
wreak havoc on existing systems and personnel, and made for great confusion in the 
agency. By the mid-1980s IRS systems fell far behind in issuing tax refbnds. The IRS 
lobbied Congress for more people and more computing hardware using misleading data, 
alleging ever increasing non-compliance (even though later analyses found these reports 
ignored simple adjustments, see Long and Burnham, 1990). Several efforts to patch its 
systems in the 1980s failed, and in one instance led to a significant loss of tax receipts. 
Despite this chaos, there was little senior management turnover in the agency and neither 
the White House or Congress demanded that senior managers be held accountable. 
Instead, both the President and Congress accepted IRS' claims that it simply needed more 
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employees and more computers to solve its problems. There never were any demands for 
IRS to "modernize" its systems to the point where people would be fired. Quite the 
opposite. The President and Congress approved in this twenty year period a doubling of 
IRS employment, from 61,000 in 1970 to 12 1,000 in 1990. Currently in 1995 IRS is 
involved in its third attempt at modernization: a $6-8 billion Tax System Modernization 
program (GAO, 1995). 
In the case of the IRS, then, the goals of the organization were to effectively 
increase the total amount of taxes collected, and the strategy chosen by management-- 
largely in the absence of outside pressure to "be efficient" and with no demands for 
employee count reductions--was to add both MIPS and employees in prodigious amounts. 
The result was an expansion in output, but with stagnant productivity despite huge 
investments in IT. 
Conclusion 
We believe that, based on our findings, it is no longer worthwhile to ask the 
question , "Does investment in IT lead to greater productivity." The reason is that the 
relationship between productivity and IT is powefilly effected by the organizational goals 
and management strategies being pursued by individual firms. This argument may apply to 
industries and sectors as well. In some industries, say banking, the pursuit of market share 
may require IT investments with little regard to productivity or short term ROI. How 
long these kinds of investments can continue may depend on the surplus produced in other 
sectors of the business. 
References 
Barua, A.; Kriebel, C.; and Mukhopadhay, T. "Information Technology and Business 
Value: An Analytic and Empirical Investigation." University of Texas at Austin, Working 
paper, May 199 1. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-95-07 
Belsley, David; Edwin Kuh, and Roy E. Welsch. Regression Diagnostics. New York: John 
Wiley, 1980. 
Berndt, Ernst R., and Catherine Morrison, "High-Tech Capital Formation and Economic 
Performance in U.S. Manufacturing Industries: An Exploratory Analysis," Working Paper, 
Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, WP #34 19EFA, April 1992. 
Brynjolfsson, Erik; Hitt, Lorin. "Is Information Systems Spending Productive? New 
Evidence and New Results." International Conference on Information Systems, Orlando, 
Florida, December 1993. 
Brynjolfsson, Erik, "The productivity paradox of information technology," 
Communications of the ACM, 36, 12, December 1993. 
Burnham, David. A Law Unto Itself Power, Politics, and the IRS. New York: Random 
House, 1989. 
Charremza, Wojciech W. and Deadman. Derek F. (1992). "New Directions in 
Econometric Practice," Publ. Edward Elgar. 
Cron, W, and Sobol, M., "The Relationship Between Computerization and Performance," 
Idormation and Management, 6:  171 - 18 1, 1983. 
General Accounting Office, Tax System Modernization. Washington D.C.: GAO, 
December 1995. 
Judge, George G., Griffiths, William E., Carter Hill, R., Lutkepohl, Helmut and Lee, 
Tsoung-Chao, 1984. "Theory and Practice of Econometrics," Publ. John Wiley and 
Sons. Second Editon. 
Laudon, Kenneth C. , Dossier Society. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 
Laudon, Kenneth C. and Marr, Kenneth L., "Productivity and the Enactment of a Macro 
Culture," International Conference on Information Systems, Vancouver, December 1994. 
Loveman, Garry. "An Assessment of the Productivity Impact of Information 
Technologies." Working paper. Management in the 90s. MIT, Cambridge Mass., 1988. 
Loveman, Garry. "The Productivity of Information Technology Capital." Working Paper. 
Management in the 90s. MIT: Cambridge, Mass., 199 1. 
Malone, Thomas W., and Joanne Yates and Robert Benjamin, "Electronic Markets and 
Electronic Hierarchies," Communications of the ACM, Vol30 (6), June 1987. 
National Research Council, Review of the Tax Systems Modernization of the Internal 
Revenue Service. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-95-07 
Office of Technology Assessment, A Preliminary Analysis of the IRS Tax Administration 
System. Washington D.C.: U.S. Congress, OTA, March 1977. 
Office of Technology Assessment, The Social Security Administration and Information 
Technology, A Case Study. Alan F. Westin and Kenneth C. Laudon. Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Congress, 1986. 
Osterman, J.F., "Productivity and IT Capital Stock, 1972-1978." Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 1986, vol. 39, 1, 175-1 86. 
Panko, Raymond R., "Is OEce Productivity Stagnant," MIS Quarterly, vol 15, 2, June 
1991. 
Parsons, D.J., Gottlieb, C.C. and Denny. M., "Productivity and computers in Canadian 
banking." Uinversity of Toronto, Department of Economics, WP 90 12, June 1990. 
Roach, Stephen S., "Technology and the Services Sector: The Hidden Competitive 
Challenge," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 34, Number 4, December 
1988. 
Roche, Stephen S., Services Under Siege-The restructuring imperative. Harvard Business 
Review, (September-October, 199 1). 
Roche, Stephen S., "Policy Challenges in an Era of Restructuing," Special Economic 
Study, Morgan Stanley, January 1992. 
SAS Institute. SAS Versiorl 6.08. SAS Circle, Cary, NC. 1994. 
Siegel, D. and Griliches, Z. "Purchased services, outsourcing, computers, and productivity 
in manufacturing." National Bureau of Economic Research, WP #3678., April 1991. 
Social Security Administration. Information Systems Plan. Baltimore, Md., 1993. 
Strassman, Paul. The Business Value of Computers, Information Economics Press, New 
Canaan, Conn., 1990. 
Tushman, Michael L., and Anderson, Philip. "Technological Discontinuities and 
Organizational Environments," Administrative Sciences Quarterly. vol. 3 1, September 
1986, pp. 439-465. 
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Washington d.C., 
1991, Table 657. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-95-07 
U.S. Department of Justice. Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States. 
Washington D.C. : Department of Justice, 1993. 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Handbook of Methods, 
Bulletin 2285, April 1988. 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Productivity Measures for Selected 
Industries and Government Services, Bulletin 2349, February 1990. 
Weill, Peter. "The Relationship Between Investment in Information Technology and Firm 
Performance," Information Systems Research, Vol. 3(4) December 1992, pp. 307-333. 
Wolq Edward N. and Baumol, William J. "Sources of Postwar Growth of Information 
Activity in the U.S.," C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, no. 
87-14, June 1987. 
Data Sources Notes 
General: Several federal sources were used in parts of the study to fill in gaps in data, and 
fill-in background knowledge on budgetary expenditures. See the following: 
Executive Office of the President. "Budget of the United States Government". United 
States Government Printing Ofice, (various years). 
"Annual Report Commissioner and Chief Counsel Internal Revenue Service" (various years) 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the United 
States. (various years) 
Social Security Administration. Social Security Brrlletit~: Annzral Statistical Szlpplemerzt, 
1991. Superindendent of Documents, U.S. Gov. Printing Ofice. 
Employees: 
There are several sources of total employment and none of the sources agree with each 
other. The annual Executive Budgets of the U. S. Governent provide the best source since it 
has contained employment data since the 1940, is subject to more reviews than most other 
sources and it is widely available to the public. In addition, we would like to thank TRAC 
at Syracuse Univeristy, and Sue Long, for providing us with detailed employee head count 
data for the years 1970-1990. 
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Workload measures 
Social Security Administration publishes annaual statistics on the number of SSA clients. 
The Table 5.A4 (p163) of the 199 1 Statistical Supplment of the SSA Bulletin contains 
number of OASDI (Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance) beneficiaries and is the 
Workload data used for SSA. 
Internal Revenue Service publishes an "Annual Report: Commissioner and Chief Counsel: 
Internal Revenue Service", which contains tax return data. A summary of this data is found 
in "Statistical Abstract of the United States". These sources agree and both were used. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation publishes an annual report that contained the fingerprint 
data (total number of prints in the FBI's files) but discontinued this in the 1980s. From 1980 
on we relied on agency annual reports and interviews with FBI officials. In addition, we 
relied on annual reports of the Department of Justice, of which the FBI is a Bureau. 
Computer Capacity (MIPS) 
MIPS capacity data is derived from GSA annual reports of computer inventory in the 
federal government. (See also Eindor, 19851. We would like to thank the Babbbage 
Institute at the University of Minnesota for supplying us with the detailed GSA annual 
surveys of computer inventory in the federal government, 1970-1990. 
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